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Zoning Restrictions Applied to Mobile Homes
Byron D. Van Iden*
R ECENT POPULATION INCREASES, coupled with the apparent inability
of the United States housing industry to overcome problems of tight
money, galloping costs, and labor shortages, have resulted in a serious
undersupply of new single family dwellings in the low to middle price
ranges.' These conditions have caused rapid expansion of the mobile
home industry.2 Derived from this is a demand for more mobile home
parks,3 whose expansion has been frustrated by public pressure, munici-
pal policies, and zoning restrictions which attempt to keep mobile homes
and mobile home parks out of a given area.
The owner of an existing mobile home park (frequently operating
as a nonconforming use) faces the same obstacles to expansion as the
developer of a new park. It is the thesis of this paper that a municipality
may not prevent expansion of an existing mobile home park (in the
absence of a clear showing that to do so is necessary to promote the
public health, safety, or welfare) by excluding mobile home parks from
the zoning resolution, and through statutory limitations on the ex-
pansion of nonconforming uses. After examining treatment by the
courts of regulating and excluding mobile home parks, several possible
approaches will be shown for the mobile home park developer to use
in overcoming these zoning restrictions.
* B.B.A., Western Reserve University; Third-Year student at Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law; law clerk for a Cleveland law firm.
1 To achieve Congress' goal of a decent home and suitable living environment for
every American family we must build 26 million new units every year for the next
ten years. Operation Breakthrough, Questions and Answers, U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, p. 1, June 1970.
2 U.S. Housing Cure: Buy Mobile Homes; Cleveland Plain Dealer, p. 1 (April 2,
1970). The Nixon Administration has gone on record in support of Mobile homes as
a partial solution to the housing shortage, stating that mobile homes provide the
easiest way for nearly half of all American families to meet their housing needs, and
that mobile homes will be counted in the future when the government reports on
progress toward solving the housing crisis.
According to the Mobile Homes Manufacturers Association, 6650 Northwest High-
way, Chicago, Illinois, 60631, over 400,000 units were produced in 1969, nearly double
the amount of 1966. It has been predicted that in 1970 one in every two single family
homes sold in the United States will be a mobile home. They now account for over
90% of all new single-family homes under $15,000. Mobile Home Sales Roll Toward
$3-Billion, Business Week, p. 74, January 24, 1970.
According to Fortune Magazine, the current rate of expansion for the mobile
home industry is 30% per year; the average unit sells for about $6,000 with furnish-
ings. Mayer, Mobile Homes Move into The Breach, p. 126, March, 1970.
3 During 1969 only 118,000 new park sites were created, although over 400,000 new
mobile homes were sold. Fortune, op. cit. supra n. 2.
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Regulating Mobile Homes by Zoning
The mobile home industry of 1970 is derived from the house-trailer
industry that supplied temporary living quarters in the 1930's and im-
mediately following World War II. That industry was typified by
cramped quarters and sordid trailer parks, occupied essentially by mi-
grant workers. These conditions led to legislation which attempted to
establish standards as a check to the seemingly inherent dangers to
mobile homes, and are largely responsible for the poor public image
of mobile home parks today.
A municipality may, under its police power,4 regulate and restrict
mobile homes.5 The right to regulate depends upon the particular
statute.0 Any regulation thereunder which reasonably promotes the
health, morals, safety, or general welfare of the community will be
sustained.7 Where a trailer park can not be prohibited because it en-
joyed a nonconforming use it is still subject to reasonable regulation.8
Illinois has gone so far as to rule that its communities have virtually
a free hand in dealing with mobile home parks.9
Regulation of trailer camps by zoning restrictions must be tempered
by reasonableness, which becomes the test of its constitutionality.1
Various forms of licensing and permit restrictions have been reviewed
4 Cliff v. Board of Health, 342 Mass. 781, 175 N.E. 2d 489 (1961).
5 Huff v. City of Des Moines, 244 Iowa 89, 56 N.W. 2d 54 (1952); Davis v. McPherson,
164 Ohio St. 375, 130 N.E. 2d 794 (1955); Inhabitants of York Harbor Village Corp.
v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 140 A. 382 (1928); Stevens v. Royal Oak Township, 342 Mich.
105, 68 N.W. 2d 787 (1955); Smith v. Building Inspector for Plymouth Township, 346
Mich. 57, 77 N.W. 2d 332 (1956); Gust v. Canton Township, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W. 2d
772 (1955); Clark v. Joslin, 348 Mich. 173, 82 N.W. 2d 433 (1957); City of Manchester
v. Weber, 100 N.H. 409, 128 A. 2d 924 (1957); Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343
Mass. 592, 180 N.E. 2d 333 (1962); Harriman v. Kabinoff, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 210, 40 Misc.
2d 387 (1963); State v. Hess, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 76 N.E. 2d 300 (1947).
6 Clark v. Joslin, supra n. 5. Municipal powers are derived from the state, either
from the legislature or state constitutional authority to enact a zoning ordinance.
1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice, 35 (3d Ed., 1967). Once given an enabling act
by the state, the municipal zoning ordinance must not exceed the bounds of neces-
sity for the public welfare, or it will be stricken as an unconstitutional invasion of
property rights. Burritt v. Harris, 172 S. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965).
7 Commonwealth v. Amos, 44 Pa. D. & C. 125 (1941).
8 Rutland v. Keiffer, 124 Vt. 357, 205 A. 400 (1964).
9 Rezler v. Village of Riverside, 28 Ill. 2d 142, 190 N.E. 2d 706 (1963).
10 A property owner's right to make legitimate use of his land may not be reduced
by unreasonable restrictions under the guise of police power. Burrit v. Harris, supra
n. 6. The extent to which property rights must yield to the police power is deter-
mined by a weighing of the private loss against the public benefit. Fiore v. Highland
Park, 76 Ill. App. 2d 62, 221 N.E. 2d 323 (1966). Where zoning classification rendered
property valueless for many years, without valid relationship to issues of public wel-
fare, health, or safety, it resulted in a complete taking or condemnation of the prop-
erty without compensation, and was unlawful. Pearce v. Village of Edina, 263 Minn.
553, 118 N.W. 2d 659 (1962).
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by the courts; they are generally upheld,1 ' except when shown to be
arbitrary and unreasonable. 12
Municipalities frequently exclude mobile homes from their defini-
tion of detached one-family dwellings. 5 Courts have upheld this, even
when the mobile home is rendered immovable because of its purchase
without wheels and is attached to a permanent foundation, 14 though
there are some decisions holding otherwise. 15 Having thus classified
them separately, they are usually confined to certain zones while being
kept from others." Provisions restricting occupied mobile homes to
established mobile home parks are generally upheld, unless in the
absence of a comprehensive zoning plan.17 This has been held true
even in a case where the statute restricted mobile homes to established
mobile home parks, and there were none. The court held that a munici-
pality was under no duty to provide a mobile home park.' Mobile
11 Operator of a mobile home park was required to file a plan of the park before
a permit to operate it could be issued. This was held reasonable to safeguard the
public health for proper sanitary conditions. Cloverleaf Trailer Sales Co. v. Pleasant
Hills, 366 Pa. 116, 76 A. 2d 872 (1950).
Ordinance held unconstitutional which barred construction or operation of mo-
bile home park without first securing written permission from town and complying
with regulations. People v. Stewart, 204 Misc. 490, 122 N.Y.S. 2d 843 (1953). Held
valid an ordinance which required park operator to pay annual and weekly license
fees, required park to be located on well-drained site, required park sewage system
and treatment plant, did not permit mobile homes to remain in park more than 70
days. Karen v. East Haddam, 146 Conn. 720, 155 A. 2d 921 (1959). License ordinance
upheld in the absence of evidence concerning expense involved in regulating mobile
home park business. License fee was $500.00. Chicago v. Scholl, 2 Ill. 2d 90, 116 N.E.
2d 872 (1954). Upheld license fee of $200.00 per year, plus $1 per week per trailer
parked for 3 days or less, and $2 per week per trailer parked for a longer period.
These fees held not prohibitory or confiscatory. Bellington v. East Windsor Town-
ship, 17 N.J. 558, 112 A. 2d 268 (1955).
12 Held unconstitutional statute requiring permit for operation of mobile home park
in county of specified population density, where only one county had such density.
County Board of Supervisors v. American Trailer Co., 193 Va. 72, 68 S.E. 2d 115
(1951). Plaintiff's property was located in primarily commercial area, the city never-
theless zoned it as residential. Held arbitrary and discriminatory and invalid, since
licenses were granted to others similarly situated. Eau Gallie v. Holland, 98 S. 2d
786 (Fla. 1957). Area zoned commercial to the exclusion of luxury mobile home
park. Was arbitrary and unreasonable, where such zoning bore no substantial rela-
tion to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Hillsborough County v.
Twin Lakes Mobile Homes Village, Inc., 154 S. 2d 64 (Fla. App. 1963). Licensing
provision of zoning ordinance was held invalid, where no state enabling statute was
provided for it. Tomlinson v. Marion County Plan Comm., 234 Ind. 88, 122 N.E. 2d
852 (1954). See also, 22 A.L.R. 2d 775.
13 Zullo v. Board of Health, 9 N.J. 431, 88 A. 2d 625 (1952).
14 Manchester v. Phillips, supra n. 5.
15 Morin v. Zoning Board of Review of Lincoln, 102 R.I. 762, 232 A. 2d 393 (1967);
Douglas v. Badman, 206 Pa. Super. 725, 213 A. 2d 88 (1965); State v. Work, 449 P. 2d
806 (Wash. 1969).
16 Wilson v. Kunstmann, 7 Wis. 2d 387, 96 N.W. 2d 709 (1959); Wright v. Michaud,
160 Me. 164, 200 A. 2d 543 (1964). Davis v. McPherson, supra n. 5. For other cases
see, Yokley, op. cit. supra n. 6, §§ 28-71, pp. 381-382.
17 People v. Clute, 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S. 2d 826 (1965).
18 Napierkowski v. Gloucester Township, 28 N.J. 481, 150 A. 2d 481 (1959).
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home parks frequently have been excluded from residential areas.19
Other local ordinances confining them to, or keeping them out of,
commercial, industrial, or agricultural areas, similarly have been up-
held. 20
Municipal regulation of mobile home parks must not conflict with
state regulation.21 The mere existence of a state statute providing for
state regulation does not supersede authority of municipalities, when
municipal power is expressly authorized and there is no justification
for supposing that state regulation should preclude municipal regula-
tion. 22 However, where the legislature expressly permitted operation
of a trailer park, a township could not, without express legislative
authorization, suppress them.23 Mobile home parks have been held
to so affect the public interest as to be a proper subject for police power
regulation in the areas of: access to public streets,24 minimum floor
area requirements, 25 sanitation and registration of mobile home parks
and guests, 20 proximity of mobile homes to lot lines, street lines, and
buildings; maximum number of mobile homes on a lot; maximum num-
ber of occupants, etc.2 7 Decisions in this area vary extensively among
jurisdictions.28 One Kentucky case held that impact of a busy highway
on abutting lands without regard for other considerations was insuf-
ficient to justify rezoning from residential to commercial use; 29 another
Kentucky case held that inadequacy of streets leading to property,
overcrowding of city schools by reason of number of persons occupy-
ing it, was insufficient to authorize a holding that a mobile home park
19 Stevens v. Royal Oak Township, supra n. 5. Townships have a right to exclude
mobile home parks from residential districts by reasonable provisions in zoning ordi-
nances. Exclusion from residential areas is associated with the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the community. Corning v. Ontario, supra n. 11.
20 Prohibited in agricultural or residence districts. Stevens v. Smolka, 202 N.Y.S. 2d
783 (1960); Excluded from industrial area, June v. Lincoln Park, 361 Mich. 95, 104
N.W. 2d 792 (1960); Permitted in commercial zone. Huff v. Des Moines, supra n. 5;
Permitted in agricultural district. Colt v. Bernard, 279 S.W. 2d 527 (Mo. App. 1955);
Held unconstitutional forbidding them in agricultural districts while permitting them
in commercial or industrial districts. Stevens v. Stillman, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 327 (1959).
21 Stacy v. Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E. 2d 11 (1954); Kremers v. Alpine
Township, 355 Mich. 563, 94 N.W. 2d 840 (1959), where township zoning ordinance
conflicted with State Trailer Coach Park Act; Howell v. Kaal, 341 Mich. 585, 67 N.W.
2d 704 (1954). Ordinance prohibiting mobile homes from residential-agricultural
area did not conflict with state statute regulating mobile homes, since the ordinance
did not attempt to license, regulate, or prohibit mobile home parks.
22 Supra n. 9.
23 Gust v. Canton Township, 337 Mich. 137, 59 N.W. 2d 122 (1953).
24 Windsor v. Lone Development Co., 109 Ohio App. 131, 158 N.E. 2d 391 (1958).
25 Corning v. Ontario, 204 Misc. 38, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 288 (1953); Huntington v. Transon,
43 Misc. 2d 912, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 576 (1964); Kimsey v. Rome, 84 Ga. App. 671, 67 S.E.
2d 206 (1951).
26 Manchester v. Webster, supra n. 5.
27 Southport v. Ross, 202 Misc. 766, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 196 (1960).
28 For other jurisdictional differences see, 22 A.L.R. 2d 774-802.
29 Barone v. Township of Bridgewater, 45 N.J. 224, 212 A. 2d 129 (1965).
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would be a public nuisance. 30 A California decision prevented an exist-
ing mobile home park operator from constructing additional sanitary
facilities, because an ordinance prohibited any increase in the size of
buildings on property being used for a trailer court.3 1 A Georgia
court cited the congestion inherent in mobile home parks, together
with uncertainty regarding essential utility facilities and the transitory
nature of occupants, as sufficient reason to sustain a county ordinance
requiring mobile home parks to be more than 1,200 feet from any
school ground or college campus. 32 Extra-territorial zoning has been
sustained in application to mobile home parks, in the absence of a
showing of a valid nonconforming use or accrued vested rights.
33
Municipalities may be authorized by the state legislature to regu-
late the number and population of mobile home parks to the point
where the municipality can tolerate problems presented by these parks.
This is particularly true as applied to limiting the number of mobile
home spaces in a mobile home park in a school district.34 In Michigan,
a residential zoning ordinance preventing expansion of a mobile home
park to an adjoining lot was held invalid because the lot could not
foreseeably be developed for residential use; 35 and the same conclusion
was reached by an Illinois court where the subject property was land-
locked by an existing mobile home park and was situated in a non-
residential area.36
Mobile Home Park Operating as a Nonconforming Use
A mobile home park which enjoys a nonconforming use is subject
to a particular type of regulation.3 7 In addition to the stringent re-
strictions placed on mobile home parks through the general zoning
resolution, a municipality may further restrict them by giving them
status as a nonconforming use, and then severely restrict the expansion
of nonconforming uses. These provisions are generally upheld, since
it is the policy of the law to be against extension or enlargement of
nonconforming uses.38
30 Schneider v. Wink, 350 S.W. 2d 504 (Ky. 1961).
31 Edmonds v. Los Angeles County, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 255 P. 2d 772 (1953).
32 Hornstein v. Lovett, 221 Ga. 279, 144 S.E. 2d 378 (1965).
33 Farner v. Weston, 263 N.C. 487, 139 S.E. 2d 642 (1965).
34 Yorkville v. Fonk, 3 Wis. 2d 371, 88 N.W. 2d 319 (1958), appeal dism'd 358 U.S. 58
(1958).
35 Dequindre Development Co. v. Charter Township of Warren, 359 Mich. 634, 103
N.W. 2d 600 (1960).
36 Kuiken v. County of Cook, 23 Ill. 2d 378, 178 N.E. 2d 338 (1961).
37 Grant v. Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A. 2d 363 (1957) reviews the problem of the
nonconforming use as it has developed since the inception of zoning.
38 Crane v. Board of County Commissioners, 175 Nev. 568, 122 N.W. 2d 520 (1963);
State v. Szymanski, 24 Conn. Supp. 221, 189 A. 2d 514 (1962). See also, 87 A.L.R. 2d
(Continued on next page)
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In determining the validity of zoning ordinances applied to exclude
trailer parks, the courts consider whether the mobile home park exists
as a vested property right. When the owner of a mobile home park
has established a park prior to the enactment of a zoning regulation
prohibiting such use, he has been held to have a vested right therein,
which cannot be terminated by the zoning ordinance. 39 This does not,
however, prevent the municipality from zoning unused portions of
ground for other than mobile home park uses, even where the parcels
are both owned by the same person. 40 A question frequently arises in
determining to what extent a mobile home park must have existed prior
to the enactment of a zoning resolution to qualify as a vested right. A
mere contemplated use, as opposed to actual use, will not qualify as a
vested right.41 It is necessary to incur substantial liabilities, or under-
take substantial construction on the site.4 2 Merely grading and clearing
land in preparation for a mobile home park has been held insufficient
in Nebraska,42 but sufficient in Ohio.4 3
The general policy of the law is to abolish nonconforming uses as
speedily as justice permits. 4 4 Mobile homes and mobile home parks
have thus been held not to enjoy a nonconforming use when that use has
been abandoned.45 In California the operators of a mobile home park
as a nonconforming use had accepted the benefits of an exception which
permitted them to add thirty additional trailers for three years upon
the condition that the entire nonconforming use would be abandoned
at the end of that time. The court held the operators bound thereby
under the theory of promissory estoppel.40
In attempting to enlarge a mobile home park which operates a
nonconforming use, the operator is frequently confronted with zoning
(Continued from preceding page)
16 for other cases holding that the policy of the law is against extension or enlarge-
ment of nonconforming uses. Babcock, The Zoning Game, p. 4 (U. of Wis. Press,
1966), the primary purpose of all zoning is the insulation of the single-family de-
tached dwelling, to protect the homogeneous, single-family suburb from the city.
39 Jensen's Inc. v. Killingworth, 152 Conn. Supp. 237, 206 A. 2d 114 (1964); Village of
Skokie v. Almendinger, 5 Ill. App. 2d 522, 126 N.E. 2d 421 (1955); James v. Green-
ville, 227 S.C. 565, 88 S.E. 2d 661 (1955); Bane v. PonLiac Township, 343 Mich. 481,
72 N.W. 2d 134 (1955). Howell v. Kall, supra n. 21; Richards v. Pontiac, 305 Mich.
666, 9 N.W. 2d 885 (1943); Board of Commissioners of County of Sarpy v. Petsch,
172 Neb. 263, 109 N.W. 2d 388 (1961).
40 Storm Bros. Inc. v. Balcones Heights, 239 S.W. 2d 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
41 Ohio State Students Trailer Park Co-op, Inc. v. Franklin County, 68 Ohio L. Abs.
569, 123 N.E. 2d 542 (1953); David A. Ulrich, Inc. v. Saukville, 7 Wis. 2d 173, 96 N.W.
2d 612 (1959).
42 Application of Hasting, 252 N.C. 327, 113 S.E. 2d 433 (1960); County of Saunders
v. Moore, 182 Neb. 377, 155 N.W. 2d 317 (1967).
43 Omaha v. Glissmann, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W. 2d 828 (1949).
44 Meuser v. Smith, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 417, 141 N.E. 2d 209 (1956); Crane v. Board of
County Commissioners, supra n. 38.
45 Fishman v. Tupps, 127 Colo. App. 463, 257 P. 2d 579 (1953).
46 Supra n. 31.
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restrictions severely limiting the expansion of all nonconforming uses.
In this area of the law there is a wide divergence of decisions, and each
case must be considered on its own facts.47 Any change or increase
must not operate to the detriment of the public welfare, health, or
safety.48 Violation of any additional conditions imposed by municipal
authorities in connection with an extension may justify revocation of
all nonconforming rights.49 To be able to extend a mobile home park
to an entire plot frequently depends on whether the character and
adaptability of the mobile park manifestly implies an appropriation of
the entirety to such use.50 This is to determine whether the use has
become vested or is merely contemplated.
Extension of mobile home parks as nonconforming uses generally
have been approved in jurisdictions where there were no statutory
restrictions on extension of nonconforming uses. This has held true
where the extension was within the contemplated use, and where the
court found that the nature of the use had not changed, only its vol-
ume.5 1 Where there were no statutory prohibitions against increasing
intensity, or amount, the owner of a single nonconforming mobile home
was permitted to operate a mobile home park consisting of two or more
mobile homes. 52 Enlargement of nonconforming uses has been held
permissible where necessary for their natural growth and expansion.5 3
Regarding contemplated uses, when the ordinance limits expansion of
nonconforming uses, and the area in question was not in actual use
when the ordinance was adopted, extension is usually denied. Merely
contemplating the use may be sufficient where there are no statutory
restrictions on expansion of nonconforming uses, and the intention is
indicated by the nature of the use or other circumstances. Noncon-
forming mobile home parks have been permitted to expand by reason-
able accessory uses, 54 provided such accessory use is not detrimental to
the public health, safety, or welfare. For example, the relocation of a
disposal area was held to be mere maintenance of sewage facilities and
47 Santoro v. Zoning Board of Review, 93 R.I. 68, 171 A. 2d 75 (1961); Pieretti v.
Johnson, 132 N.J.L. 576, 41 A. 2d 896 (1945); State v. Wagner, 81 N.J. Super. 206, 195
A. 2d 224 (1963).
48 Dampman v. Baltimore, 231 Md. 280, 189 A. 2d 631 (1963).
49 Supra n. 31.
50 Gross v. Allan, 37 N.J. Super. 262, 117 A. 2d 175 (1955); Fairmeadows Mobile Vil-
lage, Inc. v. Shaw, 226 N.Y.S. Pd 565 (1962).
51 Id. Generally it is not essential that a nonconforming use exercised at the time
a zoning ordinance is enacted should have embraced an entire tract in order to en-
title the owner to subsequently employ it for all such use. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co. v.
White, 281 S.W. 2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
52 Watts v. Helena, 439 P. 2d 767 (Mont. 1968).
53 State v. Szymanski, supra n. 38.
54 Jackson v. Pottstown Zoning Board of Adjustment, 233 A. 2d 252 (Pa. 1967).
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not an enlargement of the nonconforming use of a prohibited character
and thus permitted.55
Some jurisdictions have upheld zoning ordinances barring expansion
of mobile home parks as nonconforming uses,5 6 notwithstanding the in-
tention of the owner at the time of the enactment of the ordinance.
5 7
To justify the granting of an extension it must appear that there is ur-
gent necessity, not that it would merely serve the convenience of the
applicants.5s However, decisions here usually permit increases in in-
tensity or volume, as opposed to increases in area. 59 Extension has been
denied where the change was from seasonal use to year round use,60 and
where the applicable zoning ordinance completely excludes mobile home
parks from the town.0 1
Because of the doubtful constitutionality of zoning provisions for
the amortization (gradual elimination without compensation) of non-
conforming uses, the operator of a mobile home park can generally
expect to be able to at least continue use of his present area. 2 There
have been a few cases where amortization provisions have been upheld
on the state levelj 3 when required by the public welfare, and when
the termination provisions are reasonable in light of all considerations.6 4
Zoning to Prohibit Mobile Home Parks
As with most regulatory provisions relating to mobile home parks,
there is a wide divergence of decisions between jurisdictions as to
whether it is constitutional as a reasonable exercise of the police power
to totally prohibit mobile home parks within a municipality. Such pro-
hibition must be based on grounds of health, morals, safety, or general
55 Madison Heights v. Manto, 359 Mich. 244, 102 N.W. 2d 182 (1960).
56 Patchak v. Lansing Township, 361 Mich. 489, 105 N.W. 2d 406 (1960); State ex rel.
Howard v. Roseville, 244 Min. 343, 70 N.W. 2d 404 (1955); Yorkville v. Fonk, 3 Wis.
2d 371, 88 N.W. 2d 319 (1958); Davis v. Miller, 163 Ohio St. 91, 123 N.E. 2d 49 (1955).
57 Application of Hasting, supra n. 42.
58 Cleland v. Baltimore, 198 Md. 440, 84 A. 2d 49 (1951).
59 People v. Ferris, 18 Ill. App. 2d 346, 152 N.E. 2d 183 (1958).
60 Beerwort v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 144 Conn. 731, 137 A. 2d 756 (1958).
61 Washington Township v. Gould, 39 N.H. 527, 189 A. 2d 697 (1963); Contra, Crow-
ley v. Prejean, 173 S. 2d 832 (La. App., 1965).
62 22 A.L.R. 3d 1134 discusses the validity of provisions for amortization of noncon-
forming uses. Hoffman v. Kinealy, 389 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo. 1965) gives extensive dis-
cussion, pro and con, of the various decisions throughout the United States dealing
with the amortization technique of phasing out nonconforming uses. Ohio considers
amortization an obvious confiscation of property. Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St.
382, 116 N.E. 2d 697 (1953); James v. Greenville, supra n. 39.
63 Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y. 2d 553, 152 N.E. 2d 42 (1958).
64 It is not to be contemplated that pre-existing nonconforming uses are to be per-
petual in Nebraska. Wolf v. Omaha, 177 Neb. 545, 129 N.W. 2d 501 (1964).
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welfare of the community. 5 But in defining these relationships, there
is vast disagreement.
A Florida decision held that a mobile home park could not be
prohibited, because it would completely deprive the owner of bene-
ficial use of his property, since a mobile home park was the only use
to which it was reasonably adapted. Under similar circumstances in
Pennsylvania, a township ordinance sought to prohibit quarrying
throughout the entire township. An existing quarry was placed in an
industrial zone, the effect of the ordinance therefore being to exclude the
quarry in question from the township. In holding this unconstitutional,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that a zoning ordinance which
totally excludes a particular use from an entire municipality must bear
more substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals and
general welfare than an ordinance which merely confines a business
to a certain area within a municipality.67 That decision was cited later
by the same court in reviewing a similar case concerning a township
which sought to zone apartment buildings out of the entire township.65
Although multi-unit apartment buildings were not expressly prohibited,
the effect of the ordinance was totally prohibitory since they were not
provided for anywhere in the ordinance. Citing an earlier case, the court
held that the land-use restriction was unreasonable, that ". . . zoning
provisions may not be used . . . to avoid the increased responsibilities
and economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably
bring." 09
Other decisions have held unconstitutional: a retroactive ordinance
barring operation of existing mobile home parks where such bore no
substantial relationship to public health or welfare: 70 an ordinance
making mobile home parks lawful but not zoning any property for
them;7 1 flatly prohibiting them from the township. 72 A prohibition in
the form of a time limit on occupancy or parking of mobile homes has
been upheld, where a flat prohibition was held unreasonable and dis-
criminatory.73
Many jurisdictions have excluded mobile homes from certain dis-
tricts, which has the effect of barring them from the entire munic-
65 Smith v. Building Inspector for Plymouth Township, supra n. 5.
66 Id.
67 Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of West Whiteland Township,
425 Pa. 43, 228 A. 2d 169 (1967).
68 Girsh v. Board of Adjustment of Nether Providence Township, 189 A. 2d 852 (Pa.
1963).
69 National Land and Investment Co. v. Easton Township Board of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A. 2d 597 (1965).
70 Kessler v. Smith, 4 Ohio Abs. 57, 146 N.E. 2d 308 (1957).
71 Knibbe v. Warren, 363 Mich. 283, 109 N.W. 2d 766 (1957).
72 Re Falls Township Trailer Ordinance, 84 Pa. D & C 199, 44 Munic. L.R. 33 (1952).
73 Hunter v. Richter, 9 Pa. D & C 2d 58 (1956).
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ipality.74 The same result was reached where mobile homes were not
expressly forbidden, but were confined to mobile home parks, of which
there were none.75 Other jurisdictions have held that municipalities
may flatly prohibit mobile home parks,76 and New Jersey has gone
so far as to say that its municipalities may, through the zoning power,
constitutionally prevent its residents from living in mobile homes.
77
How to Overcome Zoning Restrictions and Prohibitions
From a thorough analysis of cases regarding mobile homes and mo-
bile home parks it is apparent that there is a wide divergence of decisions.
Given a particular regulatory or prohibitory situation, it is not difficult
to find several similar cases deciding the matter either way, depending
primarily on jurisdiction. For example, Pennsylvania and Michigan
both are states where it seems difficult for municipalities to severely
restrict or prohibit mobile home parks. The opposite is true of New
Jersey and New York. Yet the same basic zoning principles apply
across jurisdictions.
Several techniques are available to overcome zoning restrictions
and prohibitions on mobile home parks. The choice of which to use de-
pends on the circumstances. Almost always the weight of public opinion
is against mobile homes and their expansion. Success in overcoming
zoning obstacles therefore depends to a large extent on providing suf-
ficient factual data and logical arguments to prove that it is not in
fact necessary for the public welfare to curb mobile home expansion.
This usually involves changing a lot of minds concerning the typical
myths that mobile homes are occupied mainly by "low class" people,
by transients, create a burden on the school system, require more in
public services than they pay in taxes, depreciate surrounding property
values, and cause health and sanitation problems.
78
74 In residential district, City of Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E. 2d 870
(1957); Pringle v. Scheunock, 309 Mich. 179, 14 N.W. 2d 827 (1944); Cook v. Bandeen,
356 Mich. 328, 96 N.W. 2d 743 (1959); Pierro v. Baxendale, 20 N.J. 17, 118 A. 2d 401
(1955); In industrial district, where such park would obstruct development of town-
ship as envisioned by planners and manifested by zoning ordinance. Vickers v. Town-
ship Committee of Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A. 2d 129 (1962); Prohibited in high-
way business zone, where reasonableness of prohibition was held at least debatable.
Hohl v. Township of Readington, 37 N.J. 271, 181 A. 2d 150 (1962); Held permissible
to bar mobile home parks in certain districts except with consent of adjoining prop-
erty owners. Huff v. Des Moines, 244 Iowa 89, 56 N.W. 2d 54 (1952); Barred mobile
home parks by not permitting more than one mobile home on any parcel of land.
Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E. 2d 364 (1960).
75 Napierkowski v. Gloucester Township, supra n. 18.
76 People v. Stewart, supra n. 11; Plainfield v. Hood, 108 N.H. 502, 240 A. 2d 60
(1968). Raleigh v. Morand, supra n. 73. Hartland v. Jensen's Inc., 146 Conn. 697,
155 A. 2d 754 (1959).
77 Vickers v. Township Committee, supra n. 74.
78 Data for this can be obtained from the Mobile Homes Manufacturers Association,
supra n. 2.
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The first approach in overturning a municipal ruling against mobile
home parks is to attack the municipal authority to so act. Since munici-
pal powers are derived from the state, there must be a state consti-
tutional or legislative enabling statute, and the municipal ordinance
must not conflict with those of the state or federal government. 9 Once
the constitutionality of the municipal ordinance has been established,
try to show that the municipal authorities abused their discretion in
applying it, and that the statute does not prescribe sufficiently definite
standards for them to constitutionally act (here again, what the court
will consider sufficient depends on the jurisdiction) .8o
After determining that the ordinance itself is constitutional, ex-
amine its application to make sure it meets the requirements of zoning
viz. that it (1) promotes the public welfare (is within the police power)
and (2) is expressive of a comprehensive plan.8 ' In attacking the
ordinance from the standpoint of public welfare, it must be shown that
the questioned restrictions are not within the limits of necessity for
the promotion of health or general welfare, and that it is therefore
an unlawful taking of private property without due process of law.s2
For the ordinance to stand there must be substantial need for the re-
strictions in the interest of the public health, morals, safety, and welfare,
and the restrictions must be reasonable in light of these terms s 3 This
of course, is a matter of proof of what is or is not reasonable. Another
way of attacking the application is to allege that it is not representative
of a comprehensive zoning ordinance. If it can be established that the
zoning authority is not following a comprehensive plan to promote the
general welfare of the entire area, but is instead zoning particular par-
cels differently as situations arise, zoning resolution must be invalidated
as spot zonings 4
It may be possible to expand a mobile home park by extending a
lawful nonconforming use.8s If the zoning resolution does not restrict
79 Yokley, op. cit. supra n. 6.
80 Harriman v. Kabinoff, supra n. 5; Schneider v. Wink, supra n. 29; Broad-Miame
Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 140, 185 N.E. 2d 76 (1959).
81 Yokley, op. cit supra n. 6 at 19.
82 Averne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 587 (1938).
83 First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Evanston, 30 Ill. 2d 479, 197 N.E. 2d 705 (1964);
Sanderson v. Willmar, 282 Minn. 1, 162 N.W. 2d 494 (1968); City of Muskegon v.
Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929); Zampieri v. River Vale Township, 29 N.J.
599, 152 A. 2d 28 (1959); Burritt v. Harris, supra n. 10; Kugel v. Miami Beach, 206
S. 2d 282 (Fla. App. 1968).
84 As to what constitutes spot zoning see, 1 Yokley, op. cit. supra n. 6, ch. 8.
85 As to nonconforming uses see: 42 A.L.R. 2d 1140, 87 A.L.R. 2d 4, 87 A.L.R. 2d 33,
22 A.L.R. 3d 1134, 18 A.L.R. 2d 725; as to challenging the validity of a nonconforming
use ordinance: Mary Chess, Inc. v. City of Glen Cove, 273 N.Y.S. 2d 46, 219 N.E. 2d
406 (1966); State v. Szymanski, supra n. 38; Franklin Planning and Zoning Commis-
sion v. Simpson City Lumber Co., 394 S.W. 2d 593 (Ky. 1965); In re Yocum, 393 Pa.
148, 141 A. 2d 601 (1958).
Jan. 1971
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
MOBILE HOMES ZONING
expansion of nonconforming uses extending the use may be possible,
if it is reasonable to the normal growth and expansion of the existing
use. Ordinances which restrict or prohibit expansion of nonconforming
uses will probably be upheld, since one of the recognized principles
of zoning is to eliminate nonconforming uses as speedily as justice per-
mits. In jurisdictions which uphold provisions for the amortization
of nonconforming uses it must be shown that amortization schedules
are unreasonable as to time, and are not directed toward some reason-
able aspect of land use regulation under properly delegated police power.
These factors are usually decided by a weighing of public benefit against
private loss.
Many zoning resolutions authorize the granting of exceptions.8 6 To
qualify the applicant must reasonably prove that application of the
ordinance to his particular property amounts to a confiscation thereof,
that the proposed use is reasonably necessary for the convenience and
welfare of the public, that granting the exception will not conflict with
the public interest, and that the applicant would sustain an unnecessary
hardship if it were not granted.
If mobile home parks are flatly prohibited by the zoning resolution
or are not included anywhere in it a variance might be obtained.87 The
burden is more difficult than with exceptions (which the ordinance au-
thorizes the use but not in the particular district desired), there must
be a showing of unnecessary hardship unless the variance is permitted.
Owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions
of the ordinance would result in unnecessary hardship.
Conclusion
When faced with the problem of trying to overcome zoning re-
strictions on mobile home parks, regardless of which of the above tech-
niques are used, success will depend to a large extent on the degree to
which the developer is successful in convincing the municipality or
court that his mobile home park is not in fact a nuisance to be shunned
at every opportunity, but that it can and does have a proper place in
the total community planning, to make a worthwhile contribution to
86 Zoning Board of Adjustment of New Castle County v. Dragon Run Terrace, Inc.,
216 A. 2d 146 (Del. 1966); Crowther, Inc. v. Johnson, 255 Md. 379, 170 A. 2d 768
(1961); Gravin v. Zoning Board of Review of No. Kingstown, 109 R.I. 138 (1966);
Gerozak v. Todd, 233 Md. 25, 194 A. 2d 799 (1963); Jackson v. Guilford County Board
of Adjustment, 2 No. Car. 408, 163 S.E. 2d 265 (1968); Overholtzer v. Zoning Board
of Adjustment, 31 D & C 2d 793, 82 Mont. A. 119 (1963); Coronet Homes, Inc. v.
McKenzie, 439 P. 2d 219 (1968); see also, 2 Yokley, op. cit. supra n. 6, Ch. 9.
87 Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Mentor Township, 168 Ohio
St. 113, 152 N.E. 2d 372 (1958); Ohio State Students Trailer Park Co-op, Inc. v.
Franklin County, supra n. 41; Anstine v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33,
190 A. 2d 712 (1963); Papanek v. Rayniak, 23 Ill. App. 2d 183, 161 N.E. 2d 694 (1959).
Allen v. Humboldt County Board of Supervisors, 50 Cal. Rptr. 444 (Cal. App. 1966);
see also, 2 Yokley, op. cit. supra n. 6, Ch. 9; 22 A.L.R. 2d 775 and 89 A.L.R. 2d 663.
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the community. These are questions of fact and problems of evidence.
Regardless of how severe the zoning obstacles, one or more of the
above techniques may prove successful. However, even if the developer
overcomes the most stringent restriction of all, viz.: total prohibition,
he should realize that his next task is in complying with the many
restrictions that probably will be applied. It is apparent that the
courts sometimes will go to great lengths to find these restrictions within
the definition of a proper application of the zoning power. Therefore,
the developer should be ready to provide a well-planned mobile home
community that will comply with considerations of reason, rather than
merely to try to get by with overcrowding, etc., that will almost cer-
tainly be struck down as harmful to the public welfare.
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